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IN THE -SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES. 
LETTER 
FROM: 
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, 
IN RESPONSE TO 
Senate resol~(;tion of March 16, 1892, relative to th~ title by which the 
Cherokee Nation hold the Cherokee Outlet. 
MARCH 21, 1892.-Referred to the Committee on Indian Affairs antl ordcreu to be 
printed. 
DEPARTl\IENT OF THE INTERIOR, 
Washington, llfarch 17, 1892. 
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Senate resolu-
lution of the 16th instant in tlw following words: 
Resolvecl, 'l'hat the Secretary of the Interior be directed to transmit to the Senate a 
copy of his letter of February 13, 1891, to Hon. I. S. Struble, chairman of the Com-
mittee on Territories of the Honse of Representatives of the Fifty-first Congress, 
upon the natnre of the title by which the Cherokee Nation hold the Cherokee Out-
let, and of the report thereon by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, dated January 
26, 1892, both of w bicb are referrerl to in the opinion of February 25, 1892, by the 
Assistant Attorney-General for the Interior Department, upon the legality of the 
agreement between the United States and the Cherokee Nation, providing for the 
('ession of the Cherokee Outlet to the United States. · 
In response thereto I have the honor to transmit herewith copies of 
the pa]>ers called for. 
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, 
JOHN w. NOBLE, 
The PRESIDEN'l.' OF 'l'HE SENATE. 
Secretary. 
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, 
Washington, February 13, 1891. 
SIR: On January 17, 18Dl, Mr. Mansur introduced in the House of 
Represenbttives a bill which in effect proposed to appropriate $7,489,-
718.72, to pay the Cherokee Nation at the rate of $1.25 per acre, tor 
any title, claim, or interest they might have to land within what is 
k1town as the Uherokee Outlet. If the Cherokees upon due notice re-
fuse to accept the provisions of said act, the President is authorized, 
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within ninety days after ascertaining such refusal, by proclamation to 
declare said outlet to be incorporated into and he a part of the Ter-
ritory of Oklahoma, and subject to the laws thereof, and thereafter 
said lands are to be opened to settlement under the homestead and 
town-site laws on conditions prescribed. 
This bill was referred to the Committee on Territories, and by you 
inclosed to this Department with a request for my views as to the de-
sirability for a favorable report on the measure and passage thereof hy 
Congress at this session. On receipt of this r<'quest the matter was 
inadvertently referred by the Assistant Secretary to the Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs; and herewith is sent a copy of the report of that 
officer. 
By way of premise the Commissioner :::;tates that no action of the 
executive officers of the Government, nor the provisions of treaties 
with the Cherokees prior to that of J\fay 6, 1828 (7 Stats., 311), have 
any bearin~ upon the present status of the Cherokee Outlet. After re-
ferring to that and other treaties, and the citation of decisions sup-
posed to be applicable to the questions involved, he arrives at the con-
clusion that up to the. date of the treaty of July 19, 1866 (14 StatR., 
7!l9), "the Cherokees had a full and complete fee-simple title to the 
lands embraced in the Cherokee Ontlet." 
He then considers the effect of the treaty of 1866, and concludes tbat 
it does not cbange or modify the title to said lands, but simply gives 
the United States the right to settle friendly Indians thereon to whom 
the Cherokees were to sell at a price to be determined; and he holds, as 
to such lands as have not been so sold, "they are absolutely r)rivate 
property, in which the United States has no more interest than has a 
State in private lands w hlch are liable to escheat." He has no doubt 
that the appropriation of tl1is land in accordance with the provisions of 
the bill, without the assent o.t the Cherokees, would be decided on ap-
peal to the courts to be" illegal and void," and for the Government to 
open the outlet in the manner proposed would be "to disregard its sol-
emn obligations and violate its faith in order to accomplish that pur-
pose." 
The careful consideration which I have given to the subject does not 
sustain the conclusions arrived at by the Commissioner, for, in writing 
to Gen. Fairchild, chairman of the Cherokee Commission, under date 
of October 26, 1889, in relation to the purchase of the claim of the In-
clians to this outlet, I said: 
The United States mnst be sovereign within the limits of its own territory. It is 
conscious of a purpose to wrong no one, and yet to allow its own people to expand 
over the lana that is theirs; to give to the Indians of the Cherokee Nation an income 
not only mof>t munificent, but permanent, for the outlet to which the Government 
already has fee-simple title, snbjeet to the use its title intlicates, and upon which it 
might settle adverse tribes without })aying the Cherokees therefor more than would 
lH} due under appraisement already made than 47.49 cents per acre. 
After reading the report of the Commissioner, examining the treaties 
and decisions cited by him, and further consideration of the subject, I 
~ee no reason for changing the views then expressed as to the title of 
the Outlet. Therefore, in sending you a copy of his letter it seems 
proper that the reasons which prevent me from coming to the same 
conclusions should be stated; and also that the many errors of law and 
fact into which the Commissioner has fallen should be pointed out. 
It is not necessary in this connection to rehearse the well-known his-
tory of, and all the dealings of the United States with, the Cherokees. 
It is sufficient to say that prior to 1817 all of the Cherokees resided 
east of the l\1ississippi. By treaty of that year they ceded certain of 
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their lands to the United States, and it was agreed that such of them 
as would settle west of the Mississippi on the Arkansas River should 
receive their due proportion, acre for acre, in exchange for the ceded 
lands. The treaties were to continue in full force with those remaining 
east as well as those going west of the l\iississippi. The Government 
was anxious, for good reasons, to locate them altogether upon the Ar-
kansas River, and many e.tforts were made to that end. In March, 
1818, President Monroe wrote to the chief of the Arkansas branch as 
follows: 
It is my wish that you should have no limits to the west, so that you may have 
good mill seats, plenty of game, and not be surrounded by the white people. 
And on October 8, 1821, Mr. Calhoun, the Secretary of War, under 
whose charge the Indians were, wrote to the chiefs of the Arkansas 
Cherokees as follows: 
It is to be always understood that in removing the white settlers from Lovely's 
purchase, for the purpose of giving the otttlet promised you to the west, you acquire 
thereby no right to the soil, but rnercly to an outlet, of which you appear to be already 
apprised, and that the Government reserres to itself the 1·ight of rnaking such disposition 
as it may think proper with regm·d to the salt springs ttpon that tract of count1·y. 
Then follows the treaty of May 2, 1828 (7 Stats., 311), in the pream-
ble of which special reference is made to "the pledges given them by 
the President of the United States and the Secretary of War of March, 
1818, and 8th October, 1821, in regard to the outlet to the west, and as 
may be seen by referring to the records of the War Department." 
This shows that the Commissioner's statement, that "neither the 
action of the executive officers of the Government, nor the provisions 
of the treaties with the Cherokee Nation, concluded prior to the treaty 
of May 6, 1828, have any bearing upon the status of the Cherokee Out-
let," is erroneous. On the contrary, such executive action was the basis 
of the treaty itself. 
By section 2 of the treaty, the possession of 7,000,000 acres is guar-
anteed to the Cherokees forever by specified bounds, and 
In addition to the 7,000,000 of acres thus provided for and bounded, the United 
States further guarantee to the Cherokee Nation a perpetual outlet west, and a free 
and unmolested use of aU the country lying west of the western boundary of the 
above-described limits, and as far west as the sovereignty of the United States and 
their right of soil extend. 
This is the first grant of the outlet west, and it must be apparent that 
at this time it was the pm·pose of the United States only to grant, and 
the Cherokees expected only to get-in the language of Mr. Calhoun, 
made a part of the treaty by reference-"no right to the soil, but 
merely to an outlet;" a mere right to pass to and fi'om the domain 
west, an easement or franchise only. 
In cont5equence of the selection by the Creek Indians of a portion of 
the lands of the Cherokees, on February 14, 1833 (7 Stats., 414), an-
other treaty was made, whereby the lands of the Cherokees are again 
defined, with the same provision as to the outlet; with, however, a res-
ervation to the United States to permit other Indians to get salt thereon, 
and the stipulation that letters patent are to be issued at-; soon as prac-
ticable "for the land hereby guaranteed." 
By section 5 of this treaty it is said: 
These articles of agreement and convention are to be considered supplementary to 
the treaty, before mentioned, between the United States and the Cherokee Nation 
west of the Mississippi, dated 6th of May, 1828, and not to vary the rights of the 
parties to said treaty; and, further, that said treaty is inconsistent with the pro-
visions of this treaty, now concluded, or these articl~s of convention and agreo:w.ent, 
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It must be apparent that this treaty did not change what was before 
an easement into a fee simple. 
By a further treaty of December 29, 1835 (7 Stats., 4 78), in consider-
ation of $5,000,000, the Cherokees ceded to the United States all their 
lands east of the Mississippi. 
In article 2 reference is made to the agreements in the two preceding 
treaties to convey the 7,000,000 acres and the guarantee of the out-
let in the same terms as theretofore; it is then agreed that, in conRi<l-
eration of $500,000, the United States shall convey in fee Himplc to the 
Cherokees an additional tract of land, amounting to 800,000 acres, part 
of the Osage Reserve in Kansas, and sometimes known as the Neutral 
Lanus. And by section 3 it was provided: 
The Uniteu States also agree that the lanfls a hove cedcrl by the treaty of Fehrn-
ary 14,1833, including the outlet, and those cedeu by this treaty, 8hall all be inclu<le<l 
in one patent, executed to the Cherokee Nation of Indians by the President of the 
Uniteu StatPs, according to the provisions of the act of May 28, 1830. 
The act of 1830 here referred to authorized the President to exehange 
lands with the Indians residing east of the l\fississippi for lands we~t 
thereof, and to issue to them. if they desire, a patent for the same; said 
htuds to revert to the United States "if the Indim1s become extinct or 
abandon the same." 
On December 31, 1838, a patent was issued to the Cherokees, and 
particular attention is called to its recitals: 
Whereas by certain treaties made by the United States of America. with the 
Cherokee Nation of Indians of the sixth of May, one thons:mfl eight huiHlrc<l :nul 
twenty-eight; the fourteenth of February, one thousand eight hundred nwl thirty-
three; and the twenty-ninth of December, one thousand eight hundretl aml thirty-
five, it was stipulated and agreed on the part of the Unite<l States that, in consi<l-
eration of the promises made in the saicl treaties, respectively, the Unitecl Stntes 
should guarantee, secure, ancl convey by patent to the said Cherokee Nation certain 
tracts of land; the descriptions of which t.raets and the terms an<l CO]l(litions on 
which they were to be conveyed are set forth in the secon(l and third artirlcs of the 
treaty of tlJC twenty-ninth of December, one thousan<leight hundred and thu:ty-1ive, 
iu the words following. (Col. 9, Records of Patents, G. L. 0., p. 34:.) 
Then are quoted at length articles 2 and 3 of said treaty, followed by 
a description of the tract of 7,000,000 acres and of the outlet as sur· 
veyed, and also of the tract of 800,000 acres; then follows the granting 
clause, which recites that "in execution of the agreements and stipula-
tions contained in said several treaties," the United States give and 
gTant to the Cherokee Nation the described land, to have and to hold 
the same, ''with the rights, privileges, and appurtenances thereunto 
belonging to the said Cherokee Nation forever," ~mbject, however, to 
the right reserved to permit other Indians to proeure salt, which has 
been ascertained to be within the limits prescribed for ''the outlet 
agreed to be granted;" "and subject also to all other rights reserved to 
the United States in and by the articles hereinbefore recited, to the 
extent and in the manner in which the said rights are so reserved;" 
and subject also to the condition of reversion as provided by the act of 
May 28, 1830, supra. 
A.ll of these conditions and recitals are omitted from the Commis-
sioner's report, except that referring to the act of l\lay 28, 1830. 
It seems to me evident that it was not intended by the patent to con-
vey to the Cherokees any other interest or estate in the outlet than 
was originally given them. It is expressly stated to be made subject 
to the reserved rights of the United States, to the extent and in the 
manner reserved. What those reservations are is made plain by ref-
erences and recitals. Article 2 of the treaty of 1835 is recited at 
CHEROKEE OUTLET 
length, and this on its face purports to be, anrl is, a recital from the 
treaty of 1828 and of 1833 (supra,). This last treaty declares it is sup-
plementary, and is not intended to vary the rights of the parties to the 
former; aud that treaty shows the grant of the outlet to have been 
made subject to the conditions stated by Mr. Calhoun, Secretary of 
War, in his letter of October 8, 1821, where he declares the grant is 
made upon the condition, which the Indians well understood, that they 
arc to "acquire thereby no right to the soil, but merely an outlet." 
So that, by all rules of construction, in contemplation of Jaw, the 
letter of Mr. Calhoun is as much a part of the condition of the patent 
as if it were spread at length therein, and it was not intended by the . 
patent to attempt to convey to the Cherokees a larger estate than was 
originally granted them. 
But if such intention existed, the patent is ineffective to convey a 
larger estate than was given by the grant. A patent is not a grant, it 
is but evidence thereof; a muniment of title, and not the title itself. It 
can not enlarge or change a grant, nor diminish it by its recitals; where 
error i~ committed in its recitals, the patentee only takes the estate 
originally granted. (E. N. lVIarsh, 5 L. D., 96; Gazzam v. Pldllips, 20 
How., 372; Cragin v. Powell, 128 U. S., 69:3.) 
1'he Commissioner seems to have bee~ mhded by the general terms in 
whith the habendum clause of the patent is couched, and to have lost 
sig-ht of the conditions of the original grant, which are iterated and reiter-
ate<! in the several treaties, and finally so referred to in the patent so as to 
make them part thereof. The guaranty was of "a perpetual outlet," 
and when the Government proceeded to give its deed for the same it 
was very properly stated therein that the land was so granted Hforever." 
This is very different from conveying a fee simple title. The fact that 
the right of way or perpetual outlet was embraced in the same clause 
and covered by the very language whereby the fee simple title to the 
other two tracts was intended to be conveyed no more makes the ease-
ment a fee simple than that the converse would be true. Both titles 
were in perpetuity, but of different degrres. In the one caRe the pat-
ent evidenced the fact that the ice simple title had vassed from the 
United StateR, an<l in the other that the easement had passed while the 
fee remained in the United States. 
The case of Holden v. Joy (17 \Vall., 211), cited lJy tbe Commis-
sioner to suRtain his views, iu no respect does so. The 800,000-acre 
tract heretofore mentioned, and known as the Neutral Lands, having 
been ceded by the Cllerokees to the United States to sell aud to hold in 
trust the proceeds for them, the court was eonsidering only the title to 
that particular tract, and held that the Indian title thereto was fee 
simple. :Mention of or the slightest reference to the outlet is not made 
throughout the decision. It is an entire misconception of its purport 
on the part of the Commissioner to quote it as authority to sustain the 
proposition that the title of the Indians to the outlet is a fee simple. 
Even the citation made by him from the decision to support the propo-
sition that the condition in the patent as to the abandonment by the 
Indians was void does not sm;tain him, as that question was not 
decided by the court, but was expressly reserved, as would have been 
shown if he had quoted the remainder of the sentence. 
The case of the United States 'D. Reese, in 5 Dill., 405, referred to by 
him as in 8 Cent. L. J., throws no light on the subject. The question 
there was whether the Indians had a fee simple title to lands within the 
Cherokee Nation. The court so held, and discharged a party charged 
with timLer trespass, under section 5388, Revised Statutes, upon the 
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7,000,000-acre tract. The question of title to the outlet was not in-
volved. 
In the case of the United States v. Rogers (23 Fed. Rep., 657) Judge 
Parker, after reading and quoting from the patent of December 31, 
1838, says, the title of the Indians to the outlet is ''substantially the 
same kind of a title" as that by which they held their other lands, 
"the only difference being that the outlet is encumbered with the stip-
ulation" that other Indians may be permitted to get salt thereon. He 
maintained the jurisdiction of the district court of the western district 
of Arkansas in the matter, and discharged the party charged with 
arson for want of jurisdiction over the lands in the outlet which he 
declared to be ''set apart and occupied" by the Cherokees. But in this 
case the judge, in the examination leading up to his opinion on the ques-
tion of title, satisfies himself by stating in a general way that the out-
let was granted by the treaties, and then looks only to the patent to 
see what was granted, and quotes from the descriptive and habendum 
clauses thereof, and does not quote its recitals from the treaties. 
This somewhat cursory examination of the question of title much 
weakens the force of that decision. Besides, the question of the title 
by which the Cherokees held the outlet, was not directly involved in 
that case, as the learned judge says (p. 665): 
By the treaties and patent above referred to the Cherokee Outlet was beyond ques-
tion set apart to the Cherokees, and to that extent was in a condition the converse of 
that which is necessary to attach it to the district of Kansas. It matters not what 
may have been the extent of their title. If they had a title of any degree whatever, 
it was set apart to them. 
He then showed that it was "occupied" by the Cherokees, and there-
fore concluded that "it does not come within the designation of Indian 
country not set apart and occupied by the Cherokees;" and upon that 
ground discharged the prisoner. 
In phe case of Wolf (27 Feel. Rep., p. 611 ), cited by the Commissioner, 
the question was one of conspiracy to defraud the Cherokee Nation 
out of certain moneys, and the same judge, in delivering his opinion, 
referred to the Rogers case, just quoted, as determining that the 
Indians had a fee-simple title to the outlet, though that question was 
not directly involved in the case. 
The Commissioner quotes the case of the United States v. Soule (30 
Fed. Rep., 918) as deciding "that no dh•tinction was made in the 
granting clause (treaty of 1833) between the 7,000,000-acre tract and 
the outlet." In this he is mistaken. ~Judge (now l\lr. Justiee) Brewer, 
of the United States Supreme Court, who delivered the opinion of the 
United circuit court of the diRtrict of Kansas in that case, after refer-
ring to the proviso in the treaty of 1833 relative to the issue of letters 
patent, then says: 
In pnrsn::mce of this treaty, patent was issued for all the lands, including the out-
let west. No distinction was made in the granting clause between the 7,000,000-
acre tract and the outlet west. 
By ev ry r:ule of grammatical construction it is the granting clause 
of the patent to which the judge here refers, an<l not the treaty of 1833, 
as interpolated by the Commissioner. 
In this last case the judge of the circuit court refers to and dissents 
from the former decision of Judge Parker in the Rogers case, both on 
the question of the jurisdiction of the district court of Arkansas over 
the outlet and the estate of the Indians in the outlet. In passiug upon 
this point Judge Brewer examines the character of that estate. Going 
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back to the treaty of 1828, he traces the title down, and sums up his 
conclusions as follows: 
Manifestly Congress set apart that 7,000,000 acres as a home, and that was there-
after to be regarded as set apart and occupied, "because," as e:xpressell in the pre-
amble of the treaty, "Congress was intent upon securing a permanent home." Be-
yond that the guaranty was of an outlet-not a territory for residence, but for 
passage ground-over which the Cherokees might pass to all the unoccupied domains 
west. But while the exclusive right to this outlet was guaranteed, while patent was 
issued conveyiug this outlet, it was described and intended obviously as an outlet 
and not as a home. So, whatever rights of property the Cherokees may have in this 
outlet, jt was not territory set apart as a home, and is not territory within the lan-
guage of the act of 1883, " set apart and occupied" by the Cherokee tribe. 
This conflict between Judges Parker and Brewer (the latter presiding 
in the higher court) must further weaken the force of the opinion of 
the former. 
In the Commissioner's letter it is remarked that in the fifth article of 
the treaty of 1835 with the Cherokee Nation, the United ~tates cove-
nanted and agreed that the lands ceded totbeCherokeeNation, includ-
ing the 7,000,000 acres "and the outlet," shall at no future time, with-
out their consent, be included in the territorial limits of any State or 
Territory. 
A different construction may be placed on this article. It is to the 
effect that the United States "hereby covenant and agree that the lands 
ceded to the Cherokee Nation in the foregoing article" shall not, with-
out tlwir consent, be included, etc. The lan(ls here referred to are 
those mentioned in the third article, I think, beyond any question. 
That article says: 
The United States also agree thnt the lands above cedell by the treaty of February 
14-, 1833, including the outlet and those ceded by this treaty, shall be included in 
one patent executed to the Cherokee Nation of Indians, etc. 
Congress did not seem to consider the outlet as being of the "ceded 
lands," thf' plain intendment of that section being that the ceded lands 
under both treaties, and also the right to the outlet-a mere easement-
. shall be included in one patent. But even if the intention was to desig-
11ate tl1e outlet as ceded lands, it by no means follow;s that a fee-simple 
title passes by the cession, and under the doctrine of the Cherokee 
Tobacco case (infra) and the act of March 3, 1871 (infra), the Govern-
ment has a right to exercise sovereignty over said lands as it pleases. 
I think there ought to be no doubt, on the review of the matter, in 
concluding that the estate of tne Indians in the outlet is only an ease-
ment, which secures them a mere right to use and occupy it for specitie<l 
plu'poses. Such a grant by the Government is not a peculiar or unusual 
one, for in many treaties setting apart reservations as the home of cer-
tain tribes a provision is also inserted authorizing them to use for hunt-
ing purposes other tracts of land for an indefinite period. 
By Article 10 of the Cherokee treaty of 1866 (14 Stats., 799), the Chero-
kees were guaranteed the right to sell products within their nation 
witl10ut paying any tax thereon to the United States. By act of 1868 
(15 Stats., 167) the United States levied a tax upon tobacco "produced 
anywhere within the exterior boundaries of the United States.'' 
A levy of the proper tax was made upon certain tobacco grown within 
the Cherokee Nation, and the right to do so being contested, the ques-
tion came before the Supreme Court of the United States, whose de-
cision, sustaining the right of levying the tax under the statute as 
against the exemption claimed under the treaty, will be fouud in the 
case of "The Cherokee Tobacco" (11 Wallace, p. 617). 
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The following clause was inserted in the Indian appropriation bill of 
1\Iarch 3, 1871 (16 Stats., 566): 
That hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States 
shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with 
whom the United States may contract by treaty: Provided fnl'fhel', That nothing 
herein contained Ahall be construed to invali<bte or impair the obligtttions of any 
treaty heretofore lawfully made and ratified with any such Indian nation or tribe. 
TlJis proviso took nothing from the force of the enactment and added 
nothing to the strength of the treaty obligations in existenee. It simply 
declared the law as the Supreme Court had repeatedly decided it to he. 
No treaty obligations were to be impaired by the enactment itself. 
Those obligations were to remain in unimpaired vigor, subject, however, 
thereaJter, as they bad been theretofore, to the paramount right of the 
political department of the Government to repeal them by Congressional 
enactment whenever thought proper, a right incident to the sovereign 
power of the Government aud essential to its existence. See the Chinese 
exclusion case (130 U. S., 581, 600), and the cases therein cited. Also 
see Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway Company (135 U.S., 
641, G33-G55.) 
This act was afterwards referred to by the Supreme Court in the ca~e 
of the United States v. Kagama (118 U. S., 375), and it will be seen 
by readiug the deci~ions referred to that neither Congress nor the 
Supreme Uonrt thought that the exercise of the right thus to legislate 
was "to disregar<l its solemn obligations and violate its faith." 
Sufficient has been said, I think, to show many errors of law and 
fact in said report, and to sustain the views entertained by me. And 
I rcgl'et that the Commissioner should have thought proper to charge 
that those who differ from him in judgment are "disregarding solemn 
obligations and violating plighted faith," instead of confining himself 
to an expression of his views on the law and facts, as requested. 
In eouclnsion, the Commissioner says that from the reports recently 
received ii:om the Board of Commissi01iers appointed under the provi-
sions of the Indian appropriation bill of :March 2, 1889 (25 Stats., 980, 
100;'5), to negotiate for the cession of these landR, it is in<lirated that 
the differences bet,veen them and the Cherokees may yet be reconcile(l, 
and the United States acquire by consent of the lndianH a clear title 
to said lands without having recourse to the proposed legislation. In 
this I regret to say that he seems also to be mistaken. Recent com-
munications from the Board of Commissioners show that negotiations 
dudng the past year have been barren of results, if not entirely futile. 
Propositions have been made by our Commissioners which were met by 
.counter propositions, some of which were so extravagant and unheard-
. of in character that the Commissioners were compelled to decline all 
discu~sions in relation to them. And now, after repeated effort to bring 
about an amicable settlement of these matters, no agreement has been 
reached, and the negotiations have come to an end. Whether they will 
be renewed and with what results remains for the future to diselose. 
So far as I can see we are now no nearer amicable arrangement than we 
were at the beginning. 
I therefore think, in view of what has been said, and of other con-
siderations not necessary to press upon you now, that if Congress in-
tends to open up the Cherokee strip to settlement, the measure pro-
posed, or some similar law, should be speedily enacted. 
Of course, the fo egoiug views must be taken to be applicable only to 
the Cherokee Outlet, in which I believe the InJians have only an ease-
ment, which Congress has poW'er to declare at an 
-OOmpensation for such interest. 
Very respectfully, 
Hon.I.S.STRUBLE, · 
Ohairman Oommittee on Territories, House of Representatives. 
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In my report, after giving the substance o the provisions of the 
I stated that " nei~her the action of the executive officers of 'ttt.41H~"., 
e'l1lment nor the proVI ions f the treaties with the Chos.·\I'A."o 
concluded prior to he treaty of May 6, 1828 (7 Stats., 311 
bea~ng upon the p'resent status of the Cherokee Outlet." 'l'h1"- • -tn:a.1t.A:::': 
ment youTegard as erroneous. You quote :&om the letter of PrEisid~en1~i'; Monroe,. of ~areh, 1818, and that of the Secretary of War, of Ootober 
1821, and say: 
Then fallows the treaty of May 2, 1828 (7 Sta.ts., 311), in the :preamble of 
speeial reference is made to "the pledges given tlieln by the Prestdent of --, ---~· 
Sta and the &\cretary of Warz of. JJ.rch, 1818, and October 8, ,1821, in 
outlet to the west, and as may oe seen en referring to the records of the 
partm«mt." 
Itt perba s immaterial, but reference to the statute 
rules bf gr&nimatical COnstruction, the Clause last nurr~1'D~it-~1r~~~~ what loll i~ and not tO the pledges referred to.. .1: 
of'the: preamb1e from bicb the quotation ia taken l'~il~·: a.W: ftl):k'm'if! , 
_.nd whe~ ~ ptes&nt location of the Chero>lik~~ees::~in!t!:::::~J=~~:~~=~~ to tli~ir preae :t repose, and tending, ,as the past d4 
dation antf mi8ery J an,d the Che:rolieeS being an.xiGUS to &'fold a•lh' ~~eq'ii8nc:~:-~il:j;;~ 
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yet not questioning their right to their lands in Arkansas as secured to them by 
treat~', ::nHl resting also upon the pledges given them by the President of the United 
States and the Secretary of War, of March, 1818, and 8th of Octo her, 1821, in regard to 
the outlet to the west, and as may be seen on referring to the records of the \Var Depart-
ment, still being anxious to secure a permanent home, and to free themselves and 
their posterity from an embarrassing connection with the Territory of Arkansas and 
guard themselves from such connections in the future. 
It will be seen that the letters of the President and Secretary are not 
referred to as on record in the War Department. What "may be seen 
on referring to the records of the War Department" is that the Chero-
kees are still "anxious to secure a permanent homr," etc. 
It is to be further remarked that the" outlet" r• ferred to by Mr. Cal-
houn is not the "outlet" nuder disc,Jssion, but au other oue embracing 
a mucl1 larger extent of country. (See "'l'he Cherokee Nation of In-
dians," by C. C. Royce, p. 246 and map No. 9. Also, second article of 
treaty of 1833.) · 
You quote from subsequent treaties and thf' patent, and conclude 
that the treaty shows the grant of the outlet to have been made subject 
to the conditions stated by 1\ir. Calhoun, that l>y all rules of construc-
tion in contemplation of law, the letter of Mr. Calhoun is as much a 
part of the condition of the patent as if it were spread at length therein, 
and that it was not intended by the patent to attempt to c nyey to the 
Cherokees a larger estate than was originally granted them. 
I can not reach the conclusion that the declaration of :1\Ir. Calhoun 
that "you acquire thereby no right to the soil, but merely to an outlet,'' 
etc., was made a part of the original grant. 
It is not referred to in the body of the treaty as limiting, (·ontroWng, 
or defining the title or estate to be conveyed. It is fonnd in the pre-
amble, which recites the object of the parties in making the treaty and 
the reasons moving them thereto. The grantor does not refer to it, but 
the Cherokees give it as one of these reasons. 
According to Bouvier, "In the interpretation of a statute, though 
resort may be had to the preamble, it can not limit or control the ex-
press provisions of the statute." The grant of the Outlet and other 
lands was made by the second article of the treaty, which contains no 
reference to these pledges, and in construing the grant the courts do 
11ot appear to have found it necessary to refer to the preamble. But if 
we are to look outside of tbe several treaties and pat(\nts, then declara-
tions made contemporaneously with the treaty of 18:)5, and witl1 direct 
reference to the present outlet, 'vonld seem to be entitled to mneh 
greater consideration than tlw statement made by Secretary Calhoun 
with reference to another outlet seven years before the firHt treaty re-
ln,ting to these lands was conclu(led. 
Ma.rch 14, 1835, articles of a treaty were agreed upon iu this city by 
J. F. Schermerhorn, on tbe part of the United States, and a delegation 
of Cherokee Indians, which treaty (according to the title page of the 
printed articles) "by the President of the United States, is directed to 
be submitted to the Cherokee Nation of Indians for their consideration 
and approbation." This provisional _treaty is substantially the sa,me 
as that concluded at New J3Jcbota; Deceml>er 2U, 1835 (7 Stats., 478). 
In a memormHlum prepared by the Seeretary of War, lion. Lewis 
Cass, and delivered to Senator King, of Georgia, Fel>ruary 28,1835, re-
ferring to the two delegations of Eastern Cherokees then in the city, 
one headed by John Ross and the other by .John Ridge, he states that 
the discussion between the latter and 1\Ir. Schermerhorn on the part of 
the Government have terminated in a general understanding respect-
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ing the basis of the arrangements. He then refers to the pecuniary 
considerations and says: 
Besides these pecuniary stipulations a tract of very valuable land, estimated to con-
tain about 800,000 acres west of the Mississippi, is to be added to the territory already 
possessed by them. This territory originally contained about 7,000,000 acres, in 
audition to which they were entitled to the use of another tract containing about 
6,000,000 acres for the purpose of an outlet or communication with the tribes and 
country west of them. It is proposed in the arrangement with Ridge and his party 
to grant them the entire p1·operty of this tract of 6,oou,ooo acres fm· their 11nconditional 
use; this will make, for the whole country given and proposed to be given to them 
west of the Mississippi, 13,800,000 'teres ofland. (Senate Ex. Doc. 120, Twenty-fifth 
Congress, second session, p. 98.) 
The italics are mine. 
The Secretary thus indicates with clearness and beyond the possi-
bility of mistake that whatever the intention had been under the pre-
. vions treaties it had now been determined to vest the "entire property" 
of the Outlet in the Cherokees. It will be noticed that this declaration 
was made before the provisional treaty had been signed by the parties 
thereto. This memorandum, as is stated therein, bad been previously 
submitted to the President and the course there indicated had been 
approyed by him. 
March 16, 1835, President Jackson addressed a communication to 
the Cherokee delegation in which he refers to the treaty just concluded 
(which was to be void unless approved ·by the Cherokee people) and 
says: 
I shall in the course of a short time appoint commissioners for the purpose of meet-
ing the whole llOdy of your Jleople in council. They will explain to you more fully 
my views and the nature of the stipulations which are offered to you. 
These stipulations provide-
(1) For an addition to the country already assigned to you west of the Mississippi, 
and for the conveyance of the whole of it by.pateut i11 fee simple. " " " 
There are few separate communities whose property, if divided, would give to the 
persons comprising them such an amonut. 
It is enough to establish you all in the most comfortable manner; a11d it is to be 
ohserved that besides this there are thirteen millions of acl'es conre.lJcd to the Western 
Cherokees and yourselves by former treaties, and which are destined for your and 
their permane11t residrnce. So that your whole country west of the Mississippi will 
contain not less than thirteen millions eight hundred thousand acres. 
The italics are mine. 
This is not only a contemporaneous declaration by one of the con-
tracting parties as to the 11ature of the estate promised in the new 
treaty, but an interpretation by the hig-hest executive officer of what 
l1ad been conveyed to them by former treaties. · 
If the Jetter of Mr. Calhoun "is as much a part of the condition of 
tl1e patent as if it were spread at length therein," why is not the solemn 
declaration of the President that the Outlet lands (which must be in-
cluded to make the 13,800,000 acres) are destined for their permanent 
residence, although not incorporated in the preamble, as much a part 
of the condition of the patent as though it were spread at length therein; 
and if so, why does not the latter declaration (not to mention its higher 
authority) supersede and override the former~ 
Again, in a report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, dated 
Augu~.;t 3, 1835, Mr. Schermerhorn, who was endeavoring to secure the 
ratification by the Cherokees of the treaty of 1835, quotes an address 
made by him in council on July 20, 1835, in which he makes the follow-
ing statement (Senate Ex. Doc. 120, Twenty-fifth CongTess, second ses-
sion, p. 456) : 
Articles 2 and 3 declare that you are to have $4,500,000 in money, to be paid as 
stipulated in the following articles, and 800,000 acres of land, in addition to the 
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lands alrPndv secnrcd to the Cherokee Nation in the treaties with the Cherokees 
weHt; :tll(l th;1 t this iH to lw in fnll of all yonr lanlls east of the Mississippi, and your 
claims upon the Pnitc<l Statcs. The whole quantity of lands that you will now have 
west secured by this and other treaties will be 13,800,000 acres, which is more than 
all t.he lands the whole Cherokee Nation owned before the treaty with Gen. Andrew 
Jackson in 1817, by which they were to have acre fo1' acre for their lands east on the 
west of the Mississippi. I say you will have more land than you had there; for by 
that treaty you sold to the United States about 4,000,000 acres and you still own here 
a hont 7,000,000 acres, making in all 11,000,000 acres, so that without t.he 800,000 
ll!'l't'S whieh you buy by this treaty, yon will have 2,000,000 acres more west of the 
MiHsissippi than yon bad here before the treaty of 1817. The fourth article declares 
that all of your lands west shall be secured to yon by a patent deed from the Presi-
(Leut of the United States, and you will hold it by the same title the white man holds 
his lands, as loug as you exist as a State and reside upon it. 
I believe that I bave not fallen into error of law or fact in stating 
that-
Neither the action of the executive officers of the Government nor the provisions 
ofthe treaties with the Cheroke~ Nation concluded prior to the treaty of May 6, 
1828 (7 Sta.ts., 311), have any bea.rmg upon the present status of the Cherokee Outlet. 
It muRt be remembered that the treaties of 1828 and 1833 had 'been 
made with the "Western Cherokees" or those who had removed to the 
west. llut notwithstanding all the efforts put forth by the GoYernment, 
mlly a comparatively small portion of the Cherokees had so removed. 
In a work entitled "The Cherokee Nation of Imlians, by Charles 0. 
Hoyce,'' printed in an extract from the Ji'ifth Aunual Report of the Bu-
l'e;m of Ethnology, Mr. Royce thus refers to the situation at this time 
(p. 266): 
Oeorgia refused to submit to the decision ("Worcester 1'8. State of Georgia, 6 Pet., 
G15) and alleged that the court possessed no right to pronounce it, she being by the 
Constitution of the United States a ~lOvereign and independent State, and no' new 
Stn te could he formed within her limits without her consent. 
The President was thus placed between two :fires, Georgia demanding the force ot 
l1is authority to protect her constitutional rights by refusing to enforce the decision 
of the !'onrt, and the Cherokees dema.nding the maintenance of their rights as guar-
nnte('d them under the treaty of 1791, and sustained by the decision of the Supreme 
Court. 
It was manifest the request of both could not be complied with. If he assented to 
the d<'sire of the Cherokees a civil war was likely to ensne with the Sta tc of Georgia. 
If he did not enforce the decision and protect the Cherokees, the faith of the nation 
would be violated. In this dilemma a treaty was looked upon as the only ~tltt'rua­
tiYe, by which the Cherokees should relinquish to the United States all their interest 
in lands east of the Mississippi and remove to the west of that river, and more earuest, 
urgent, and persistent pressure than before was applied from this time forward to 
compel their acquiescence in such a scheme. 
ln view of this situation and of the positive declaration of Secretary 
Cass and President Jackson we may not conclude that the treaty-making 
power was willing to make further concessions as to lands as well as 
moneys, and, as a result, that whatever had been the status of the Out-
let under the treaties of 1828 and 1833, the fee was intended to be con-
veyed and actually was conveyed by the treaty of 1835, which stipulated 
tlwt the Outlet should be included in a patent, to be issued under the 
provisions of the act of 1830. 
It is to be further observed that the treaties of 1828 and 1833 had 
been made with the Western Cherokees, as before stated. These were 
a small proportion of the Cherokee people, bad been resident in Ar-
kansas, and were known as "hunters," '\Vhile the great ma~s of the 
peOJ)le, resident in Georgia, Tennessee,. and the adjoining States, had 
abandoned the bunter life. As was said by John Ross: 
The willlcrness has given place to comfortable dwellings and cultivated fields, 
stoeked with domestic animals. Mental culture, industrious habits, and domestic 
enjoyments have succeeded the rudeness of the savage state. 
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While to the former class an "outlet," over which they could roam 
and hunt, would have been a valuable possession, it would have been 
wholly useless to the latter class. 
In the light of this contemporaneous evidence, not before me when I 
prepared my previous report, I am inclined to believe that I would have 
been justified in stating that it was unne<'essary to go back of the treaty 
of 1835 and the negotiations attending it, to determine the status of 
the Outlet. 
In the treaty of August 6, 1846 (9 Stats., 871) made with the three 
parties into which the Cherokees were divided, it is provided-
That the lands now occupied by the Cherokee Nation shall be secured to the whole 
CJ1erokee people for their common use and benefit; and a patent shaH be issne<l for 
the same, including the eig-ht hundred thousand aeres purchased, together with the 
outlet west promised by the United States, in conformity with the provisions re-
lating thereto, contained in the third article of the treaty of eighteen hundred and 
thirty-five, and in the third s<wtion of the act of Congress approved 1\fay twenty-
eighth, eighteen hundred and thirty, which authorizes the President of the United 
States, in making exchanges of lan<ls with Indian tribes, to assnre tbe tribe or 
nation with which the exchange is made, that the United States will forever scenre 
atHl guarantee to them and their heirs or successors the country so exchanged with 
them; anll, if they prefer it, that the United States will cause a patent or grant to 
be macle and executeu to them for the same: Provided always, That snch lands shall 
revert to the United States if the Indians shall become extinct or shall abandon tho 
same. 
It will be observed that reference is made to the treaty of 1835 ouly, 
and not to the treaties of 1828 and 1833. 
I may remark in passing that the object in making this treaty of 
1846 aud the stipulating for the issuance of a patent which had ah·eady 
issued is set out in a recent opinion of the Court of Claims, iu the case 
of the 'Vestern Cherokees: 
That treaty was a <·ompact between three parties, tho Unite<l States, the Eash·rn, 
an<l the Western Chero1(ees. Its purpose was to make the Eastern an<l the \Yestern 
Cherokees parties to the treaty of New Echota, which they had never conceded them-
selves to be, and to secure peace in tho Cherokee country. The principle upon which 
it is sought to accomplish this purpose was that on the ono hand the \Vestern Chero-
kees should participate in the purchase money which had been paid for the lands 
east of the Mississippi, and on the other that they should abandon th<:'ir autonomy 
and become suoject to the government which had been established by the Eastern 
Cherokees. 
The reason behind the principle was that in 1835 the Western Cherokees owned 
the Cherokee country west and had paid for it, and that the Eastern Cherokees ac-
quired, by the terms of the treaty of New Echota, two-thir<ls of this without paying 
for it, and at the same time retained all of the purchase money which had been given 
for their possession east of the Mississippi. A portion of this purchase mouey hacl 
been expended for the use of the Eastern Cherokees, and a portion was held as a 
trust for their benefit; the remainder had been paid to them per capita. 
If their removal had been effected on the same terms as that of the \Vestern Cher-
okees under the treaty of 1828, thoy would have received land in the Indian Terri-
tory in exchange for land oast of the Mississippi. 
As it was, they had received both land and money; but the lan(l was the land of 
the Western Cherokees. Strictly, the Government should have paid the \Vestern 
Cherokees for the lands thus appropriated, and should have deducted the price from 
the money paid to the Eastern Cherokees. It was now sought by the treaty of 1846 
to accomJ,lish this in an indirect way-the Western Cherokees were to be admittecl 
ab initio to a quasi partnership or joint ownership by the terms of which they were 
to contribute the laud in the Indian Territory and share in the proceeds of the laud 
east of the Mississippi. 
You cite authorities to show that a patent is not a grant, and state 
that I appear to have been misled by the general terms in which the 
habendum clause of the patent is couched, and to have lost sight of the 
conditions of the original grant, which are iterated and reiterated in 
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the several treaties, and so referred to in the patent as to make them 
part thereof. You say: 
The guaranty was of u a perpetual ont1et," and when the Government proceeded 
to give its deed for the same, it was very properly stated therein that the land was 
so granted "forever." This is very different from conveying a fee simple title. The 
fact that the right of way or perpetual outlet was embraced in the same clause and 
covered by the very language whereby the fee simple title to the other two tracts 
was intended. to be conveyed, no more makes the easement a fee simple than the con-
verse would be true. Both titles were in perpetuity, but of different degrees. In 
the one case the patent evidenced the fact that the fee simple title had passed from 
the United States, and in the other that the easement had passed, while the fee re-
mained in the United States. 
It is true that a patent is not a grant, but evidence thereof. It is, 
however, ''the highest evidence of title and is conclusive as against the 
Government and all claiming under junior patents or titles, until it is 
set aside or annulled by some judicial tribunal." (United States 1.'. 
Stone, 2 Wall., 525.) It is, moreover, conclusive evidence of title. 
(Gibson v. Choteau, 13 Wall., 92.) The recitals in a patent are con-
clusive. (Crews v. Bareham, 1 Black, 352.) 
But let us see if I was misled by the habendum clause. The patent 
refers to the treaties of 1828, 1833, and 1835, by which "it was stipu-
lated and agreed on the part of the United States that in consideration 
of the promises mentioned in said treaties, respectively, the United 
States should guarantee, secure, and convey by patent to the said 
Cherokee Nation certain tracts of land." It quotes the whole of the 
second and third articles of the treaty of 1835. In passing, allow me 
to remark that the second article contains the following significant 
clause: 
Proddecl, ltowerer, That if the Saline or Salt Plain on the western prairie shall fa11 
within said limits prescribed for said outlet, the right is 1:eserved to the Unite(l 
States to permit other tribes of red men to get salt on said plain in common with 
the Cherokees. 
This is also contained in the treaty of 1833. 
If the Cherokees were to receive only an easement and the fee re-
mained in the United States, where was the necessity for the United 
States to reserve the right to a1low other Indians to get salt, which right 
could alone exist in the owner of the fee~ Moreover, the clause is a 
recognition of the right of the Cherokees to get salt, which they would 
not have if their interest was only an easement. 
The third article of the treaty contains the following provision: 
The United States also agree that the lands above ceded by the treaty of February 
fourteenth, one thousand eight hundred and thirty-three, including the outlet and 
those ceded by this treaty, shall a.ll be included in one patent, executed to the Chero-
kee Nation of Indians by the President of the United States, according to the provis-
ions of the act of May twenty-eighth, one thousand eight hundred and thirty. 
It will be observed that the second article refers to the previous 
treaties, by the way of recital, to explain the reasons for the additional 
grant of 800,000 acres. 
The third article, however, is an independent propositwn, without 
recital or preamble, by which the United States agrees that the lands 
ceded by previous treaties, including the outlet and those ceded by 
this treaty, should be included in one patent, to be executed according 
to the provisions of the act of 1830 (4 Stats., 411). Under the pro-
visions of that act the President was authorized to exchange lands 
claimed and occupied within the limits of the States or Territories for 
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districts of lands, to be laid off and described, in the territory west of 
the 1\fississippi. It was made lawfhl in making any such exchange-
For the President solemnly to assnre the tribe or nation with which the exchange 
is made that the United Stntes will forever ~e(·m·e and guarantee to them, :uul their 
heirs and ~uceessors, the country so exehanged with them; and if they prefer it, 
that.the United States will cause a 1)atent or grant to be made and executed for the 
same. 
Under tlus act, as before r;een, the President solemnly assm;ed the 
Cherokees that the whole of the country asHigned to them should be 
conveyed to them by patent in fee simple. a11d that this "country" in-
cluded the outlet is shown by the quantity of land specified, and which 
was destined for their permanent 'residence. 
'fhe patent further recites that the United States have caused the 
said tract of 7 ,ooo,ooo aeres, together with the perpetual outlet, to be 
surveyed in one tract, the boundaries of which are described with full 
particularity, containing 13,57,1,135.14 aereR. It further recites that the 
United States have caused the tract of 800,000 acres to be surveyed, 
and describes the boundaries thereof. 
The granting clause is as follows: 
Therefore, in execution of the agreements and stipulations contained in said sev-
eral trcatie.·, tho United StatcH have given and granted, and hy these presents do 
give and grant nnto the sai<l Ulwrokcc Nation the two tracts of land, so surveyed 
and horeiul>cforc described; contai11ing, etc. 
Then follows the habendum: 
To have and to hold tho same, together with all tho rights, privileges and appur-
tenances thereto belonging, to the said Cherokee Nation forever, 
subject to th<> "aline stipulation, and subject to all other rights re-
serve(l to the Unitefl States; alHo to the condition of the act of l\1ay 
28, 18:30, a.-; to abau.donmeut, ete. 
If I understand yon correctly you would interpret the habendum as 
follows: • 
To ha.ve aud to hold 7,000,000 aeres of oaid first-described tract and the tract of 
800,000 acres as a horne, alHl the resi<lne of snirl tirst-describcd tract as a perpetual 
outlet, together with all the rights, prl vilegcs, etc. 
If this is the true meaning, I must collfess that I have been "misled 
by the general terms in whieh the habendum clause of the patent is 
couched." 
It may be remarked here that the weHtern bouuclary of the 7,000,000 
acres has never been a.:::;ccrtained, and no man knowH to this day where 
the "home" ceases and tlle "outlet" begins. Uertain it is that a por-
tion of the lands west of 9G0 commonly regarded as constituting the 
outlet are a paet of the home, for the Cherokee country without any of 
these lands comprises but 5,031,351 acres. The distinction between 
the home and the outlet appears to have been wholly obliterated by 
the treaty of 1835. -
Again, by the treaty of 1817 (7 Stats., 156) the Cherokees were to 
have acre for acre for their lauch; east on the west of the lVIississippi. 
According to Commissioner Schermerhorn they were entitled to 11,uoo,ooo 
acres, or 4,000,000 acres more than the "home" contained. 
You state that the case of llolden v. Joy (17 Wall., 211), cited by me 
to sustuit1 my views, in no respect does so; that not the slightest refer-
ence to the outlet is matle throughout the dedsion; that it is an entire 
miscon<'eption to quote it as authority to sustain the proposition that 
the title of the Indians to the Outlet is a fee simple; and that even the 
citation made to support the 11roposition that the condition in the 
patent as to abaudolllUellt by the Indians was void, does not sustain 
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me, as that qnf'stion was not decided by the court, but was expressly 
reserved, as would have been shown if I had quoted the remainder of 
the sentence. 
This case was not cited by me as conclusive of the title to the" Out-
let," but it has always been regarded as the basis of all subsequent 
deei~ions bearing upon Cherokee titles. It fixes the status of the tract 
of 800,000 acres conveyed by the treaty of 183.). 
It was quoted as showing the status of the title generally, and from 
this basis I attempted to show the status of the "Outlet" by quoting 
other decisions holding that the title to the latter was the same as to 
the other lands. 
You state that the citation made from that decision does not sustain 
me, as the question was not decided by the court, but was expresRly re-
served, as would have been shown if I had quoted the remainder of the 
sentence. As to this I desire to remark that at the time the report 
was prepared by this office it was not in possession of the Supreme 
Court reports. I was therefore compelled to quote at second hand 
from an Executive document (H. R. No. 54, Forty-seventh Congress, 
second Hession). 
The citation, moreover, precisely as given by me, appears in the 
printeu instructions given the Cherokee Commission by my predecessor 
and approved by yon (p. 10), and in the same connection. In fact, my 
report was based largely upon these two papers. The sentence omitted 
from the citation is: "but it is not.necessary .to decide that point, as it 
is clear that if it is valid it is a condition subsequent which no one but 
the grantor in this case can set up under any circumstances." 
As the citation is given, however, not as a deciswn of a point, but as 
an expression of opinion by the court, which is also apparent from the 
language q noted, tho omission does not appear to be material. 
'fhe case of the United States v. Reese (5 Dill., 403) you regard as 
throwing no light on the subject. 
"\Vhile it is true that the trespass with which Reese was charged 
was committed upon tho 7,000,000-acre tract, the following language of 
the eonrt is significant: 
The C1wrukee Nation of Indians derived their title to their land:s from tho Unite<l 
f\tates by grant. This grant is by v.irtne of different treaties matle between them 
awl the United States. lly the second article of the tre:tty of May 6, 18:!8 (Hev. 
Ind. Treat., 51), "the Unitetl States agrees to poHsess and gnara,ntee to the Cherokees, 
jorercr, seven miLlion acres of l:1IHl, and this guarantee is hereby solemnly ple<lged." 
Tltislaud i8 ll]uu·t of the country now occupied by them. 
The italics, except the word "forever," are mine. 
Tlte only other part of the conntey occupie1l by the Cherokees at that 
time was the outlet. While the status of the 7,000,000-acre tract only 
was in vol vetl in the ca~e, the words q noted strongly indicate that J ndgo 
Parker recognizes no distinction as to the Htatus of the two tracts. This 
. is clearly shown in the later case of United States v. Rogers (23 Fed. 
Hep., 657). 'fhe case of Reese was quoted to show the nature of the 
Uherokeo title generally, and as leading up to the case of Hogers. In 
the latter case Judge Parker says: 
By looking at the title of the Cherokees to their lands we find that they hold them 
all by substantially the same kind of title, the only difference being that the ontlot 
is incumhered with the stipulation that the United States is to permit other tribes 
to get salt on the s~tlt plains. With this exception, the title of the Cherokee N~ttiou 
to the outlet is just as fixed, certain, extensive, and perpetual as the title to any of 
their lauds. 
He thrn quotes from his derision in the Reese ease to show what the 
mtture of that title is, concluding with the words: "Tb.is in effect puts 
all the estate in the Cherokee Nation." 
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You say that Judge Parker's somewhat cursory examination of the 
question of title much weakens the force of his decision, inasmuch as 
he" satisfies himself by stating in a general way that the Outlet was 
granted by the treaties, and then looks only to the patent to see what 
was granted, and quotes from the descriptive and habendum clauses 
thereof, and does not quote its recitals from the treaties." 
There is probably no officer of the Government, certainly no judicial 
officer, who has had more occasion to investigate the question of the 
Cherokee title, or who has given the matter more research than Judge 
Parker. If he fails to quote any recitals from the patent or treaties, may 
we not reasonably conclude that he did not consider such quotation 
necessary~ 
You also say that the question of title by which the Cherokees hold 
the Outlet was not directly involved in that case, as is shown by a quo· 
tation from page 665. 
In the case of Wolfe (27 Fed. Rep., 615), Judge Parker says: 
This court held in United Sta,tes v. Rogers (23 Fed. Rep., 659), that the Cherokee 
Indians hold what is called the Cherokee Outlet by substantially the same kind of 
title it holds its other lands. The title to all its lands was obtained by grant from 
the United States. 
This case, you say, was one of conspiracy to defraud the Cherokee 
Nation out of certain moneys, the question of title not being directly 
involved. These moneys were the proceeds of the sales of lands within 
the Outlet, the question discussed by Judge Parker being whether the 
sum ($300,000) was an additional payment for lands already sold and 
occupied under the ~dxteenth article of the treaty of 1866, or a payment 
on account of unsold and unoccupied lands. He shows that the ap-
praisement of these latter lands took away no rights from the Chero-
kees and gave none to the United States, uses the language above 
quoted, and adds: 
This principle puts the title fully and completely in the Cherokee Nation, and 
lmtil it agrees to part with the same, it can not be taken from it. It has not yet 
agreed to part with these lands except for a specific purpose. It seems to me 
there need be but little trouble on the question of the title of the Cherokees to their 
lands, if we but look at this title, and understand its true nature, and are prompted 
by a sense of duty to do equal and exact justice to the Indians, and to give them that 
full measure of justice which by law and good conscience belongs to them. 
This may be an opinion on a point not directly before the court, but 
it certainly "leaves but little doubt as to what the decision of that 
court will be when the direct question arises there." 
You refer to my quotation from United States v. Soule (30 Fed. Rep., 
918), "that no distinction was made in the granting clause (treaty of 
1833) between the 7,000,000-acre tract and the Outlet," and state that 
by all rules of grammatical construction, the judge refers to the grant-
ing clause of the patent and not to the treaty. It is true that the words 
in brackets were interpolated; not, however, by me. The office not 
being then supplied with the Federal Reporter, a quotation was taken 
from the Congressional Record, where it appeared in a brief for the Chero-
kee Nation submitted by Mr. Baker. It is doubtless true that Judge 
Brewer, by grammatical construction, refers to the granting clause of • 
the patent, but as he does not remark that the patent attempts to con· 
fer any g-reater estate than the treaty, the meaning conveyed appears 
to be much the same. 
In his opinion J ndge Brewer refers to Judge Parker's decision in 
the Rogers case, and states that he is unable to yield to the force of his 
reasoning, notwithstanding the consideration which its careful prepa-
ration compelled, because the geographical argument and the double 
S. Ex. 63-2 
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description "set apart and O<'cnpicd," led him to a different conclusion. 
He held that it was set apart and, 
douttless, in a certain sense, it was occupied because the Cherokee Nation had a title 
and right to possess it; but if Congress had meant by this act to include all land 
owned by the Cherokees, the 'vords "set apart" would have been ample and the 
word 11 oceupied" was superfluous. 
Bnt while the exclusive right to this outlet was guaranteed, while the patent was 
issued conveying this outlet, it was described and intended obviously as an outlet 
and not as a home. So whatever rights of property the Cherokees may have in this 
outlet, it was not territory s0t apart for a home, and is not territory within the lan-
guage of the act of 1883, '' set apart and occu1>ied" by t.he Cherokee tribe. 
Judge Brewer virtually holds that the Cherokees " own" the Outlet. 
In the case of the Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway 
Company (33 Fed. Rep., 900), the nature of the Cherokee title is further 
discussed. 
This case involved the right of Congress to grant a right of way 
through the Cherokee lands, the grant in question being through the 
lands of the outlet. I make Lhe following extract from the syllabus 
(by the court), omitting the head lines: 
8. The title to all the lauds of the Cherokee Nation was obtained by grant from 
the United States. This title is a base, flUalified, and determinable fcc, without the 
right of reversion but o11ly the l)Ossibility of reversion, in the Unite<l States. This, 
in efft'et, vnts all the t'Sta1e in the Cherokee Nation. 
9. Congrt•ss cannot grant a right of way over the lands of the Cherokee Nation 
without its consent, on the ground that the United States has title to such land. If 
it can do so, it must be clone because the Government of the United States can exer-
cise, with reference to the lands of the Cherokee Nation, the right of eminent do-
main. 
10. The Cherokee Nation, while it owns the soil of its country, is under the polit-
ical control of the United States, and it is dependent on it for its political rights. 
This, as the history of this country has so often demonstrated, is necessary for the 
protection of its people. 
In reaching these conclusions the court refers to what it held in 
United States v. Hee~e and United States v. Rogers, and says: 
This is in suhstanee tho principle declared by the Supreme Court of the United 
States in Holden r . .Joy. 
This case waR taken to the Supreme Court on appeal, where it was 
held that the Cherokee Nation wa~ not sovereign in the sense that the 
United States, or a State, is sovereig·n, but is now, as heretofore, a de-
pendent political community, subject to the paramount authority of 
the United States. The court said: 
The fact that the Cherokee Nation holds these lands in fee simple under patents 
from the United States, is of no consequence in the present discussion, for the United 
States may exercise the right of eminent domain, even within the limits of the sev-
eral States, for the purposes necessary to the execution of the powers granted to the 
General Government by the Constitution. 
* 
The lands in the Cherokee Territory, like the lands held by private owners every-
where within the gPographicallimits of the United States, are held subject to the 
authority of the General Government, to take them for such ohjects as are germane 
to the ext'Cution of the powert> grante<l to it ; provided only that they a.re not taken 
witlwut just compensation being made to the owner. (135 U. S., 64.1.) 
• There i~ no suggestion in the opinion as to the right of the U1lited 
States to take these lands as a right of way on other ground than that 
of eminent domain, and 110 intimation of dissent from the position of 
the lower court as to the title and status of the Cherokees. There is, 
in fact, a positive and unqualified admission that "the Cherokee N a-
tion holds th se lands iu fee simple under patents from the United 
States." The decree below dismissing the bill, because the relief asked 
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for was both legal and equitable, was reversed in order that the case 
might be tried de novo, and all the questions of law and fact that either 
party chose to raise be finally determined. The court expressed some 
doubt as to whether the reasons for their conclusion should be given, 
and say: 
But as the questions raised by the demurrer were elaborately examined by the 
court below, and were fully discussed .at the bar, and as the plaintiff ought not to be 
led to snppose that a new bill in equity, based upon the alleged invalidity of the act 
of July 4, 1884, would avail any good purpose, we have concluded to state the 
grounds upon which we hold that Congress, in the passage of that act, has not vio-
lated any rights belonging to the plaintiff. 
I do not claim that the passage first quoted amounts to an adjudica-
tion of the title to the Cherokee Outlet, but it is strongly indicative of 
what the opinion of the court would be if the question were before it, 
and it seems somewhat remarkable that in giving reasons for holding 
that no rights of the Cherokees had been violated, the entire court, in-
cluding Mr. Justice Brewer, should have overlooked the fact that these 
lands actually belong to the United States, the right of the Cherokees 
being a mere easement, if such be the case. 
In my report I remarked that in the fifth article of the treaty of 1835 
it was stipulated that the lands ceded to the Cherokee Nation, includ-
ing the 7,000,000 acres and the outlet, should never be included 
within the limits of any State or Territory without their consent. 
The United States hereby covenant and agree that the lands ceded to the Cherokee 
Nation in the foregoing article shall in no future time, without their consent, be in-
cluded within the territorial limits or jurisdiction of any State or Territory. But 
they shall secure to the Cherokee Nation the right by their national councils to make 
and carry into effect all such laws as they may deem necessary for the government 
and protection of the persons and property within their own country belonging to 
their people or such persons as have connected themselves with them. 
You state that-
A different construction may be placed upon this article. It is to the effect that 
tbe United States "hereby covenant and agree that the lands ceded to the Cherokee 
Nation in the foregoing article" shall not, without their consent, be included, etc. 
The lands here referred to are those mentioned in the third article, I think, beyond 
any question. 
You quote from that article and say: 
Congress did not seem to consider the outlet as being of the "ceded lands," the plain 
intendment of that section being that the ceded lands under both treaties, and also 
the right to the ontlet-a mere casement-shall be included in one patent. But even 
if the intention was to designate the outlet as ceded lands it by no means follows 
that a fee-simple title passes by the cesRion, and under the doctrine of the Cherokee 
Tobacco Case (infra) and the act of March 3, 1871 (infra), the Government has a 
right to exercise sovereignty over said lands as it pleases. 
You then give the substance of the Cherokee Tobacco Case (11 Wall., 
617). 
I presume that by the reference to Congress the treaty-making power 
is intended. As we have already seen, the President, by whom, with 
the advice and consent of the Senate, treaties are made, solemnly as-
sured the Cherokees, while seeking· their approval of this treaty, that 
the country destined for their permanent residence, contained not less 
than 13,800,000 acres, while Secretary Cass informed the Senate Com-
mittee on Indian Affairs, with the approval of the President, that the 
whole country given and proposed to be given contained 13,800,000 
acres. Is it not clear that the lands which were not to be included 
within the limits of any State or Territory without their consent, com-
prised their entire country of 13,800,000 acres? 
This article was cited, not for the purpose of showing the nature of 
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the title, but to show that the lands of the Outlet could not be opened 
to settlement and included within the limits of a territory without the 
consent of the Cherokees, and this would be equally true whether their 
estate be in fee or merely an easement. 
The sovereignty of the United S.tates over the lands of the Outlet, 
and even over the 7,000,000-acre tract, together with the right of emi-
nent domain, rs freely admitted, but sovereignty extend~ over lands 
owned in fee simple as well as over lands belonging to the sovereign, 
and eminent domain is exercised wholly over lands not owned by the 
sovereign. 
You refer to the Cherokee tobacco case, the Chinese exclusion case. 
and Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway Company to show 
that treaty obligations are subject-
to the paramount right of the political department of the Government to repeal 
them by Congressional enactment wheneve:r thought proper-a right incident to the 
sovereign power of the Government aml essential to its existence. 
The Cherokee tobacco case can hardly be considered as authority in 
view of the following declaration of the Supreme Court in United States 
v. Forty-three Gals. Whisky (108 U. S., 497). 
The case ofthe Cherokee tobacco tax (11 'Vall., 616) can not be trcatetl as authority 
against the conclnRion we have reached. The decision onl;v disposed of that case, 
as three of the judges of the court did not sit in it, and two dissented from the 
judgment of the other four. 
· There can, however, be no question as to the existence of the right 
referred to in cases·purely politicaL It is equally true that Congress 
has no constitutional power to settle or interfere with rights under 
treaties, except in such cases. (See Holden v. Joy, 17 WaH., 247, and 
authorities there cited.) This is distinctly recognized in the Chinese 
exclusion act (130 U. S., 609). 
Possibly the stipulation in the treaty excluding the country of the 
Cherokees from the limits of any State or Territory without their con-
sent is a purely political one, but it was doubtless one of the con'!3ider-
ations that induced them to exchange their lands east of the Mississippi 
for those in the Indian Territory. But even if Congress has the con-
stitutional power to abrogate this provision of the treaty, would not 
the exercise of the power be a violation of a solemn treaty stipulation~ 
The case of the Cherokee Nation v. The Southern Kausas Ry. Co. 
has already been referred to. 
The case of the United States v. Kagama (118 U.S., 375), referred to 
in the foregoing case, involved the political status of Indians generally. 
The defendant was not a member of the tribe holding treaty relations. 
A careful reading of tbe Chinese exclusion case and the Southern 
Kansas Railway Company case has strengthened my belief that what-
ever may be the title of the Cherokees to the lands in the " Outlet," 
they can not be opened to public settlement without the consent of tlle 
Cherokees. 
The construction placed upon the rights of the Cherokees by the 
treaty-making power and by Congress fully agrees with that adopted 
by the courts. 
By the sixteenth article of the treaty of July 19, 1866 (14 Stats., 804), 
it was agreed that-
The United States may settle friendly Indians in any part of the Cherokee country 
west of 96°, to be taken in a compact form in quantity not exceeding one hundred 
and sixty acres for each member of each of said tribes thus to be settled, the bound-
aries of each of said clistricts to be distinctly marked, and the land conveyed in fee 
simple to each of said tribes, to be held in common or by their members in severalty, 
as the United States may decide. 
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Said lands thus disposecl of to be paid for to the Cherokee Nation at such price as 
may be agreed on between tho said parties in interest, subject to the approval of the 
Presid'3nt; and if they should not agree, then the price to be fixed by the President. 
The Cherokee Nation to retain the right of possession of an(l jurisdiction over all 
of said country west of 96° of longitude. until thus sold and occupied, after which 
their jurisdiction and right of possession to terminate forever as to each of said 
districts thus sold and occupied. 
It will be observed that the Cherokee Nation agrees to sell the lands 
west of the ninety-sixth degree, an indefinite quantity of which were 
lands included in the "Outlet," not to the United States but to friendly 
Indians, payment to be made to the Cherokee Nation. This is certainly 
a recognition of the nation's ownership of these lands. Again, the nation 
is to retain jurisdiction and right of possession over unsold lauds. Can 
it retain what it never possessed~ 
By a clause in the act of March 3, 1883 (22 Stats., 624), Congress ap-
propriated the sum of $300,000 out of funds due under appraisement 
of Cherokee lands west of the Arkansas River, to be paid into the 
treasury of the Cherokee Nation: 
Provided, That the Cherokee Nation, through its proper authorities, shall execute 
conveyances satisfactory to the Secretary of the Interior to the United States in trust 
only for the benefit of the Pawnees and other tribes now occupying said tract, as they 
respectively occupy the same before the payment of said sum of money. 
Now, if the Cherokees had only an easement or right of passage in 
this tract, Congress required a party without interest to convey certain 
lands to the owner of the fee, in trust for a third party. 
And yet by deeds accepted as satisfactory by the Secretary of the 
Interior, the Cherokees undertook to bargain, sell, remise, release, re-
linquish, and confirm uuto the United States, in trust, etc., certain 
described tracts of land in the Outlet. 
The sevent~enth article of the treaty of 1866 is, in part, as follows; 
The Cherokee Nation hereby cedes, in trust to the Unite(l States, the tract ofland 
in the State of Kansas which was sold to the Cherokees by the United States, under 
the provisions of the second article of the treaty of 1835; and also that strip of land 
ceded to the nation by the fourth article of said treaty which is included in the 
State of Kansas, and the Cherokees consent that said lands may be included in the 
limits of the said State. 
The lands ceded were to be surveyed, and appraised by two disinter-
ested persons, one to be designated by the Cherokee national council 
and one by the Secretary of the Interior, a third to be selected by the 
two appraisers in case of disagreement, the appraisement to be not less 
than an average of $1.25 per acre, exclusive of improvements. 
The first of the tracts referred to is the 800,000-acre tract, or Cher-
okee neutral lands, and the second tract is a narrow strip of the Outlet 
lands, being that portion of the Outlet lying in Kansas, and sometimes 
called the Ollerokee Strip. (The description, "Oeded to the nation by 
the fourth article," is erroneous, as no cession or transfer was made by 
the fourth article of the treaty of 1835.) (It is noticeable that the ref-
erence is to the treaty of 1835 and not that of 1828 or of 1833.) 
The seventeenth articJe throws much light upon the status of the 
Outlet in two or three important particulars: 
(1) The same words of transfer are used as to each of the two tracts, 
''The Cherokee Nation hereby ce£1es, in trust to the United States," 
the tract which was sold to the Cherokees, "and also that strip of the 
land ceded to the nation," etc. According to Bouvier the word "cede" 
means "to assign; to transfer; applied to the act by which one state 
or nation transfers territory to another." The highest words of transfer 
are used as to both tracts. 
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(2) The Cherokees consent that "said lands" (these words refer un· 
doubte<lly to both trarts; they certai11ly include the one last named) 
may be iududed in the limits and jurisdiction of the State of Kansas, 
thus showing conclusively that the treaty-making power understood 
the stipulation of the fifth article of the treaty of 1835 to include the 
lands of the Outlet. 
(3) The lands in both tracts are to be surveyed, appraised, and sold 
in the same manner (except that the neutral lands nwy be sold in one 
body). 
May 11, 1872, Congress passed an act "to carry out certain provi-
sions of the Cherokee treaty of 1866, and for relief of settlers on the 
Cherokee lands in the State of Kansas." (17 Stats., 98.) The preamble 
of this act is as follows: 
Whereas in order that certain provisions of the treaty of Jnly nineteenth, eighteen 
hundred and sixty-six, between the United States and the Cherokee Nation may be 
rendered clearer, and made more satisfactory to settlers upon the lands known as the 
"Cherokee Strip/' in the State of Kansas, said settlers having moved thereon since the 
date of said treaty, and for the purpose of facilitating the sale of said lands. 
The first section provides "that the strip of land lying west of the 
Neosho River, and included in the State of Kansas, cont,cyed to the 
Cherokee Nation of Indians by the United States, and now belonqing 
to scticl nation, shall be surveyed under the direction of the Commis-
sioner of the General Land Office." (The italics are mine.) 
This is a declaration by Congress tllat the land in the outlet was 
"conveyed to the Cherokee Nation of Indians by the United States," 
nnd that the portion thereof lying in the State of Kansas then belong-
ing to said nation, 110twithstanding the fact that the same had been 
ceded to the United States in trust by the seventeenth article of the 
treaty of 1866. It also provides for offering the lauds for sale, giving 
settlers the right to enter and purchase lands occupied by them. 
The third section provides that any Cherokee citizen, who had rights 
under the Cherokee laws to any portion of said lands, and whose titles 
were valid at the d.ate of the treaty of 1866, shall receive the proceeds 
of the sale of such identical land, not exceeding 160 acres, instead of 
their being invested as provided in section four. This recognizes the 
right of a Cherokee citizen, prior to the treaty of 1866, to settle upon 
lands in the "outlet" and acquire title thereto under Cherokee laws. 
The fifth section provide:::; thftt the sale of the lauds nuder the act 
shall not take place until the provisions of the act shall be accepted by 
the Cherokee national council, or by a delegation duly authorized. 
Can these provisions of the treaty of 1866 and the two acts referred 
to be reconciled with the theory that the United States never parted 
with the fee to the outlet lands, and that the Cherokees never had more 
ti1an an easement which secured to them a mere right to use and oc-
cupy it for specified purposes~ 
It has been held by the Department that the outlet lands can be dis-
posed of only as p1·ovided in .the treaty of 1866. In a letter to the 
President dated February 28, 1882, Secretary Kirkwood says: 
'£he Cherokees, by that treaty, ceded certain lands to the United States for a spe-
cific pu.rpose, to wit, the settlement thereon of ot.her tribes of friendly Indians, and 
the Umted States took the lands for that purpose and can use them for that purpose 
only. * * * (House Ex. Doc. No. 89, Forty-seventh Congress, first session. 
In a letter to the president pro tempore of the Senate, dated January 
3, 1885, Secretary Teller said: 
The Cherokees have a fee-simple title to their lands, and they do not recognize the 
right of the Department to interfere in the management of their atl'airs with refer-
ence thereto. (Senate Ex. Doc. No. 17, Forty-eighth Congress, second session,) 
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The subject under discussion was the leasing of the Outlet lands. 
But as regards the right of Congress to open these lands to settle-
ment without the consent of the Cherokees, it seems to me that it is 
wholly immaterial whether they hold a complete estate in fee to the 
lands of the Outlet or only an easement or right of passage over. 
In either case the guarantee is "forever" and "perpetual," and they 
can no more, without their consent, be divested of the latter than of 
the former. 
Ag~in, Congress in the act of J\Iarch 2, 1889 (25 Stats., 980) author-
ized the a1)pointment of a Commission to negotiate with the Cherokees 
for the cession of all their rights in theHe lands upon the same terms 
as to payment as was provided for in the agreement with the Creeks. 
Ha.ving attempted to a.equire the rights of the Cherokees, whatever 
they may be, Congress would seem to be estopped, after failure of nego-
tiations, from proceeding on the theory that negotiations are unneces-
sary. 
Yon regret that I should have thought proper to charge that those 
who differ with me in judgment "are disregarding solemn obligations 
and violating plighted faith," instead of confining myself to an expres· 
sion of my views on the law and facts as requested. The language nsed 
by me is as follows: 
But in my opinion this Government can not afford to disrcgar(l its solemn obliga-
tions and violate its faith in order to accompliRh that purpose. 
I made no charges against anyone, but ~.;imply expressed my own 
opinion as to the method propoHed by the bill. I question the motives 
of no one in this matter, and have no reason to suppm;;e that any of the 
advocate;:; of the bill are actuated by other than honest motives, or that 
they do not conscientiously believe in the absolute equity of the meas-
ures proposed. 
I have endeavored to state as clearly as possible the reasons which 
lead me to oppose any measure looking to the acquisition of these lands 
without the consent of the Cherokees, and to show that my report of 
February 4, 1891, does not contain "many errors of law and fact." I 
regret that I am compelled to differ with you in this matter, but I am 
unable to reach any other conclusion than that expressed in my fol'mer 
report. . 
fn eoncluding my report I expressed the belief that the differences 
between the Cherokees and the Cherokee Commission might be recon-
ciled and the Unites States aeqnire, by consent of the Indians, a clear 
title to the lands without having recourse to the proposed legislation. 
As the Commission have sncceded in reaehing an agreement with 
Commissioners representing the Cherokee Nation, which agrooment has 
been ratified by the Cherokee N atioual Con neil, and is now before this 
office for consideration, the result has vindicated my judgment in this 
respect. 
In connection with this subject it seems JWOper that I should refer to 
the decision of Judge Green in the Logan distl'iet eourt of the Territory 
of Oklahoma, in the case of J. II. Jordan et (tl. v. llenry J. Goldman. 
In this case the complainants, clai¥ ing to be Cherokee citizens, and as 
such entitled to farm lands and to operate a stone qua.Try on the Cherokee 
Outlet, filed their bill for an injunction against the defendant, who as 
an Army officer, was, under the proclamation of the President, dated 
February 17, 1890, and certain orders of the War Department, ejecting 
cattle and persons from the Cherokee Out1et, and was about to eject 
the complainants with their property and close up the quarry. Judge 
24 CHEROKEE OUTLET. 
G reeu quotes from several treaties with the Cherokee Nation, the patent 
ro1Jveying- the lands of the outlet to said Nation, and from the cases of 
lloldcn L'. Joy, Uuited States v. Reese, United States v. Rogers, and 
United States v. Soule, and concludes that the Cherokee Outlet was 
ceded and granted by the United States and accepted by the Cherokee 
Nation for the purpose of, and to be used as, an outlet only, and was so 
understood by both parties to the treaties and patent. He says: 
It is contrnded on behalf of tl1e complainants and alleged in their bill of com-
plaint that the Cherokee Nation is the owner of the Cherokee Outlet in fcc simple, 
and, in behalf of the defendant, that their only interest is a mere easement and that 
the fee of the lands is in the Umte<l States. It is clear, however, upon principle and 
authority, that neither one of the~:~e positions is tenable, and that the estate of the 
Cherokee Nntion is a base, qualified, or determinable fee, and that, too, whether we 
reject or retain the condition in the patent, that the lands shall revert to the United 
States, if the Cherokee Nation shall abandon the same. 
He discusses the character of this kind of an estate, and holds that 
as the Cherokee Nation could not lawfully and by right use any part 
of the Cherokee Outlet for the purpose of quarrying, selling·, and ship-
ping the stone found thereon, it could not by license authorize the com-
plainants in the suit to operate a stone quarry and to sell and ship the 
stone. He then refers to article 16 of the treaty of 1886 and holds that 
the rights of the Cherokee Nation in the use of the Outlet are not en-
larged thereby. He further holds as follows: 
If the Cherokee Nation has ceased to use the Outlet as an outlet, the cesser of the 
use hud termiuated their estate, and the lands have ?'ct·erted to the United States, 
bnt whether there has been a ces8CJ' of the use is rather a political than a judicial 
question, which r-;houlll be settled by Congress and the chief executive of the nation, 
aiHl if the lands base been abando•ed as an outlet, and snbjectcd to other uses by tho 
Cherokee Nation, or with their consent ancl by their authority, their estate has 
terminated and they have reverted to the United States·. · 
This decision substantially maintains that the estate of the Outlet is 
in the Cherokee Nation, but that such estate is less than a fee simple, 
being a fee 'Yith the condition subsequent attached by opei·ation of law. 
Accepting his position as correct, the grantor could no more divest the 
grantee of his title in the Outlet than it could if he held fee simple title, 
except upon the breach of the condition. He, however, introduces a 
new element into the discussion by suggesting that if the Cherokee 
Nation has ceased tv use the Outlet as an outlet, such cesser has ter-
minated their estate, and the lands have reverted to the United States, 
which question, he says, is rather a political than a judicial one. 
In the course of his opinion, Judge Green says: 
And as to the seven million acres, the Supreme Court of the United States in the 
caRe of The Cherokee Nation v. Kansas Railway Co. (135 U. S., 656), concedes that 
the Cherokee Nation holds the same in fee simple. The Court there says: ''The 
fact that the Cherokee Nation holds these lands, in fee simple, under patents from 
the United States, is of no consequence in the present discussion." 
He quotes other cases, and says: 
\Vhat was said in these case-s, however, was said with 1·eferenco to the estate of 
the Cherokee Nation in the permanent home lands, being the 7,000,000 acres, and the 
800,000 acres,and did not refer to the estate of the Cherokee Nation in the Cherokee 
Outlet. 
In this statement Judge Green has fallen into an error wllich is of 
great significance. He admits that the Supreme Court has conceded 
that the Cherokee Nation holds the "home" in fe.e simple, and proeeeds 
to draw a distinction as to the "outlet." The conclusion seems to be 
almost irresistible that if he had known that the utterance of the Supreme 
Court which he quotes·:had exclusive reference to the "outlet" (as is the 
fact), he would have been compelled to decide that the Cherokee Nation 
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holds the" outlet" in fee simple. tludge Green's 1aw is therefore based 
upon an" error of fact" which dest.roys the force of his reasoning. 
I have also read the opinion of the Kingfisher district court of Okla-
homa in the case of Jacob Guthrie v. Capt. William P. Hall, which in-
volves substantially the same questions as the Jlreceding case. An 
oral opinion was rendered by Judge Seay in which he holds that the 
title to the perpetual outlet west "is a mere easement, a use, subject to 
forfeiture in case the Cherokee Nation becomes extinct or abandons the 
outlet." He then holds that the nation bas abandoned the outlet by 
the voluntary sale and conveyance of some 2,000,000 acres to the Osage 
and other Indians. This opinion and that of Judge Green are directly 
in conflict as to the nature of the estate of the Cherokee Nation in the 
outlet. Judge Green also holds that the fact of the abandonment is 
rather a l)Olitical than a judicial question, while Judge Seay decides it. 
So far as I am aware, the question of the abandonment of the outlet by 
the Cherokees has never before been raised. The fact that the treaty 
of 1866 gave to the United States the right to settle friendly Indians 
west of the ninety-sixth degree, and the further fact that the United 
States has settled a large numb~r of Indians on what may possibly be 
the eastern part of the "outlet," can not, I think, be held to constitute 
an abandonment of the unoccupied lands of the "outlet," for the treaty 
of 1866 distinctly continues the right of JlOSession and jurisdiction over 
all the lands west of the ninety-sixth degree until sold and occupied. 
It was manifestly not the intention of this provision of the treaty to 
divest the Cherokees of any rights in this country which they before 
possessed, other than to secure to the United States the right to settle 
ft·iendly Indians thereon, nor did it contemplate that the United States 
could settle Indians on a narrow strip on the eastern end of these lands 
and thereby forfeit the rights of the Cherokees in all the remaining 
lands. The "outlet" is some ten townships in width, or sixty sections. 
By locating sixty friendly Indians on contiguous forties, the United 
States, under the opinion of Judge Seay, who appears to assume that 
all of the lands west of the ninety-sixth degree are a part of the "outlet," 
could have caused an "abandonment" of the entire "outlet," except 
the 9,600 acres required for these sixty Indians, which is hardly sup-
posable. Besides, what becomes of the treaty stipulations that the 
Cherokee Nation shall retain jurisdiction and right of possession over 
all of said country until sold and occupied, after which their jurisdic-
tion and right of possession to terminate forever as to each of said 
districts thus sold and occ'ltpied. 
These opinions of these lower courts seem to me to be so at variance 
with judicial, legislative, and executive action and expres~ion, as well 
as with each other, that they can hardly be regarded as authoritative 
until confirmed by some higher court. 
The courts have laid down rules by which we are to be governed in 
construing Indian treaties. In the case of Worcester v. Georgia (6 
Peters, 581), Mr. Justice McLean said: 
The language used in treaties with the Indians should never be construed to their 
preju.dice. If words be made use of which are suscepi;ible of a more extended mean-
ing than their plain import, as connected with the tenor of the treaty, they should 
be considered as used only in the latter sense. * * *" How the words of the 
treaty were understood by this unlettered people, rather than their critical meaning, 
should form the rule of construction. 
This is affirmed in 5 "\Vall., 737. Again, in Choctaw Nation v. United 
8tates (119 U. S., 1), the language is quoted, and the court adds: 
The recognized relation between the parties to this controversy, therefore, is that 
between a superior and an inferior, whereby the latter is placed under the care and 
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ro11troJ of tlte former, :m<l wldclt, while it antlwrh<'s the adolltion on the part of the 
l'11itrd States of SltdJ po]iry as their O\Vll 1mhlic intereHts may dictate :rt>cognizes, on 
tlte othe1· ltand, such au interpretation of their acts aucl promises as justice mHl reasor. 
ieman<l in all cases where power is exerted by the strong oYer those to whom they 
owe care and protection. The parties are not on an equal footing, and that in-
equality is to be made good by the superior jnstice which looks only to the substance 
of the right, without n'ganl to tedmical rules framed ll])(]er a system of municipal 
,jnrispnH1cnce formulating the rights and obligations of private J1crsons equally 
subject to the same laws 
In United States v. Payue, (8 Fed Rep., 883), the court said as to the 
treaty then under conRideration: 
In construing the treaty we have a right to take into consideration the situa-
tion of the 1)arties to it at the time it was made, the J1rOpcrty wltil'l1 is the 
snhject-matter of the treaty, and tho intention and purposes of the parties in mak-
ing the treaty. To get at thiA intention we have a right. to consider the coustrnc-tion 
tbe parties to the treaty, and who wel'e to be effected by it, have given it., mHl what 
has been their action under it. 
I think I have shown that the parties to the treaty of J 83[) nnder-
stDod that the Cherokees were to have a country of 1:3,800,000 acres, 
for which they were to receive a patent in fee, and were to hold it all 
(forever) as the white man holds his land. 
In closing, allow me to indicate the conclusions that I believe are 
warranted by this preRentation of the law and the factH in this ease: 
Firi'lt. The question of the character of the title to what is known as 
the "Cherokee Ontlet," which embraces over 6,000,000 acres of land, iR 
one of vast importance, not only so far as the rights oftheUllerokees and 
their moneyed interests are concerned, but also as involviHg the faith 
and honor of the National HoverHment. 
Se<·oud. This ofti(·e appre<'iate~ very fully the de~;irahility of ex-
tingnislling the I ll(lian title to the land in queHtion and its restoration 
to the public domain in order that it may become a part of the ~rerri­
tory and future State of Oklahoma, to whose progress and 11rosperity 
it iR so essential, and it is only desirous that the rights of the Chero-
kees in the matter slmll be fully J)rotected and the national honor eon-
served. 
Thinl. In determinillg the question of ownerRllip to the land under 
eOilRideration, the term:.;; uHed in the treaties and patent, ns we1l aR in 
contemporaneous ofiieial utterances, are to be <·onstrue<l by us in the 
meaning whieh was atta<'hed at the time by the Cherokee people. 
I;'onrtlJ. The ''outlet" referred to by J. U. Calhoun, then Scnetary of 
War, was not the "outlet" now under consideration, a]l(l <·ouRequently 
his statement that the Cherokees acquired no right to the soil, but 
merely an outlet, has little or no relevarwy in this diR<'ussion. 
Fifth. The statement of the Secretary is referred to in the prenm hle 
only, does not enter into the body of tbe treaty, and conRequeutly 
forms no essential part of the grant. 
Sixth. The act of May 28, 1830, authorized the President of the 
United States in making excha11ges of lam.ls with Indian tribrR to as-
sure the tribe or nation with wl1ich the exdwnge wm; to br made that 
the United States would forever secure and g·narantce to them and 
their heirs and successors the country so exd1anged with them, and, 
if tlwy preferred it, tlmt the United States would cause a 1)atent or 
grant to be made and executed for the same. 
Seventh. The lands Qf the Cherokee Nation, both the "home" all(l 
the "outlet," were eonveyed to that nation in excl1ange for other lands. 
Eighth. We must look to the treaty of 1835, made with the Eastern 
Cl1rrokees to indure them to n~move to the Western lands, rather than 
to the treaties of 1828 anu 1833, for the nature and character of the grant. 
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Ninth. In the negotiatiouH attending the conclusions of this treaty, 
the Cherokees were solemnly assured by the President, who had the 
right to make such assurance under the act of 1830, that 13,000,000 
acres were destined for the permanent residence of the Eastern and 
Western Cherokees, and that they would hold it by the sam~ title as 
the white man holds his lands. 
Tenth. The treaty of 1835 stipulated for the survey of tl1e "home" 
and the "outlet" in one tract. Under this survey tlte boundaries 
between the "home" and the "outlet" could not be establisl1ed, and as 
a result all distinction between the "home" and the "outlet" was thel'e· 
after obliterated. 
Eleventl1. The sixteentl1 article of the treaty of 1866 recognized the 
title of the Cherokees to all the lands in the Cherokee country. It 
granted the United States the right to settle friendly Indians in any 
part, not of the ''outlet," but of the Cherokee country west of the 
ninety-sixth degree of longitude, which description must have included 
some 2,000,000 acres of the Cherokee "home." 
Twelfth. The seventeenth article of that treaty recognized the owner-
Rllip of the Cherokee Nation in that part of the ''outlet" lying in the 
State of Kansas; under it the Cherokee Nation ceded those lands to 
the United States. 
Thirteenth. The courts of the United States, including the Supreme 
Court, l1ave held or admitted that the Cherokee Nation holds these lands 
in fee simple under patm1ts fi·om the United States. 
Fonrteenth. OongTess bas repeatedly recognized the fact that all the 
title to the "outlet" is vested in the Cherokee Nation. 
Fif'tec11th. ~l'his fact has also been recognized by the Executive De-
pa rt1nents. 
Sixteenth. If it be admitted that the Cherokee Nation has only an 
easement or right of way over this land, it can no more be deprived of 
such easement or right, lawfully, without its consent, than if it held a 
fee-simple estate. 
Seventeenth. Congress having recog~1ized tlw necessity of negotia-
tiug with the Cherokees for the relinquishment of their right, title, and 
interest in and to these lands, is now estopped from asserting that the 
Cherokees have no such right, tjtle, or interest as to render negotia-
tiom; necessary. 
Jijighteenth. The right accorded the United States by the treaty of 
186G to settle friendly Indians on lands west of the ninety-sixth degree 
can not work an abandonment of or an easement in these huids, be-
cause the Cherokee Nation is to retain the right of possession and juris-
diction over all of said country until sold and occupied (by friendly In-
dians), and their jurisdiction and right of possession is to terminate 
011ly as to each of the districts thus sold and occupied. 
Nineteenth. While it is admitted that these lands are subject to the 
right of eminent domain, such right extends only to the taking of lands 
for" public use" subject to just compensation. The opening of these 
lands to private entry and settlement is not such a public use. 
Twentieth. If the "outlet" lands could be taken without the con-
sent of tl1e Cherokees, it would be necessary to ascertain by aetual sur-
vey the western boundary of the 7,000,000 acres or ''home," in order 
that none of these lands in which the Cherokees confessedly have all 
the estate, may be opened to settlement. 
Twenty-first. To make any other disposition of the "outlet" lands 
tlmn that contemplated by the treaty of 1866, without the consent of 
the Cherokees, would, if the foregoing conclusions are correct, be a vio-
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la6on of treaty stipulations and of the solemn pledges given by Presi-
dent Jackson. 
Twenty-second. Congress at its last session extended the services of 
the Cherokee Oommission, which bas continued the negotiations with 
the Cherokee people. 
These negotiations have been successful and the agreement concluded 
has been ratified by the Cherokee Council, and now only awaits favor-
able action by Congress. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 
0 
T. J. MORGAN, 
Commissioner. 
